Against the backdrop of current research into 'logical dynamics' of information, we discuss twoway connections between conversation and computation, leading to a broader perspective on both.
that information states of children -singly, and in groups -change over time, in a systematic way triggered by various communicative events. In this universe of states and possible transitions between them, the long experience of computer scientists in modeling computation becomes relevant, from Turing's first 'single-minded' computers to dealing with the multi-agent Internet. Please note that this is not a matter of computational 'implementation', the subservient stance some computer scientists assume vis-a-vis other academic disciplines. We care rather about fundamental ideas, and the general cultural contribution of Informatics.
This paper is largely a discussion of known results and what they mean or suggest in a broader setting. Proofs and further details are found in the cited literature.
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Multi-agent information models and epistemic logic
The first step in modeling conversation is a good notion of state, and hence the 'static component' of the total enterprise. For simple scenarios like the above, a logical apparatus exists, viz. epistemic logic (Hintikka 1962 , Fagin et al. 1995 . In the Restaurant scenario, the initial information state for the waiter from the kitchen The Cards Three cards were given to three volunteers who stepped up: 1 got Red, 2 White, and 3 Blue. Each child could see its own card, but not those of the others (I was circling my little volunteers to make sure). Child 2 was allowed one question, and she asked 1: "Do you have the blue card?". 1 then I asked beforehand, and all said they knew nothing. I asked again right after the question, and now Child 1 said he knew the cards. His reasoning, as whispered to me: "She would not have asked if she had the blue card herself. So, 3 must have it."
After the answer had been given, child 1 and 2 said they knew the cards, and 3 still did not. But (with a little help) 3 did understand why the others knew the cards.
All this can be analyzed in words, but here is how things would look in an epistemic state transition framework. The initial situation again has 6 options, and the We see at once that, in the real world rwb, 1 has no uncertainty line going out, and hence he knows the cards there. ( We also see that 3 knows this, as it happens at both rwb and wrb.) Next, 1's answer eliminates all worlds with first position 'b': rwb
wrb
This reflects the final situation of the children.
Group knowledge Once again, multi-agent interaction is crucial. Indeed, the children even achieve a new level of knowledge that is sui generis, viz. common knowledge: in addition to what they know about the facts of the situation, they also know that the others know, and so on, up to any iteration. Belief and other attitudes of agents Knowledge is just one informational attitude of agents. One can also model beliefs, probabilities, and so on, using a broader variety of accessibility relations. A simple epistemic structure suffices for our aims, but we will mention less simplistic versions with agents' beliefs occasionally.
Summarizing then, our initial NEMO example is not 'child's play'. Conversational scenarios are a basic human ability involving sophisticated interactive knowledge that needs to be understood in depth. And thus, they provide a rich subject of study for Informatics, where logical and computational notions make good sense.
Conversation as computation: update actions
Communicative events range from simple public statements to complex private ones:
recall my whispered conversation with child 1. And much more subtle scenarios exist in our lives. To move this inside our logic, we need an explicit account of relevant actions and their effects. Here a powerful metaphor comes into play:
Conversation is Computation!
Conversation is really an interactive form of computation, much as present-day computational systems have many agents engaged in a wide variety of tasks.
Technically, then, conversational processes, and communication in general, may be modeled using existing systems from the computational tradition. In this paper, we will focus mainly on dynamic logic, originally developed as a logical account of programs and their effects (Pratt 1976) , which has gradually evolved into a general theory of action. We start with the simplest mechanism of information flow. Product update with event models Whispering is public announcement in a subgroup of a larger group, but it is only partially observable to the others. Hiding, secrets, and limited observation are ubiquitous in everyday communication.
Public announcement as world elimination
Consider your email. The epistemic-dynamic role of cc is public announcement.
But the more sophisticated button bcc achieves partial announcement which can even mislead other participants. More complex scenarios arise in computer security, and in the arena of games, which are often designed to manipulate information flow.
Partial observation of events may be analyzed as the following construction for changing models (Baltag, Moss & Solecki 1998 This language stays close to that of modal logic, the lingua franca of much of computational logic, and it treats dynamic processes as being equivalent up to bisimulation, probably the most widely used notion of process equivalence. Still, this section is not meant as propaganda for any approach, but as a demonstration how computational logic of conversation and much more is entirely feasible.
Dynamic epistemic logic of public announcement
The language of public announcement logic PAL is the epistemic language with added action expressions:
Here, the idea of treating announcements as actions, and having them explicitly inside modalities of the language comes from dynamic logic. The semantics is this:
There is a complete calculus of information flow under public announcement -i.e., a complete logic of basic communication (Plaza 1989 , Gerbrandy 1999 :
Theorem PAL without common knowledge is axiomatized completely by the usual laws of epistemic logic plus the following reduction axioms:
Methodology These axioms describe conversation in an elegant style, analyzing effects of assertions in a compositional way by recursion on the 'postconditions' behind the dynamic modalities. Thus, they reduce every formula of our dynamicepistemic language eventually to a formula in the static epistemic language (cf. the 'regression procedure of Reiter 2001) . In terms of the logic, the reduction procedure shows that PAL is decidable, since the static epistemic base logic is decidable.
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This method of 'dynamification' applies to a wide range of informational events.
First, choose a static language with models that represent information states for
groups of agents. Next analyze the relevant informational events as update models changing the static ones. These updates are then described explicitly in a dynamic extension of the language, which can also state effects of events using propositions that hold after their occurrence.. The resulting logics have a two-tier set-up:
static base logic dynamic extension
At the static level, one gets a complete axiom system for one's chosen models. The computational analysis then adds a set of dynamic reduction axioms for effects of events. Thus every formula is equivalent to a static one -and hence, if the static base logic is decidable, so is its dynamic extension. In principle, this modular dynamic epistemic design is independent from specific properties of the static models. E.g., the PAL axioms do not depend on assumptions about epistemic accessibility relations. Its completeness theorem holds just as well if the static models are arbitrary, validating the minimal modal logic K as some minimal logic of belief.
Technical issues Sometimes, treating conversation as computation changes our ideas about an underlying static system. E.g., the completeness theorem for PAL omits common knowledge after announcements. To get a reduction axiom for
, one must enrich epistemic logic beyond its standard version (van
is true in all worlds reachable via some finite path of accessibilities running entirely through worlds with P. Then we get the valid reduction law:
Conditional common knowledge is not definable in the basic epistemic language -but it is bisimulation-invariant, and completeness proofs are easily generalized. 11 There is an analogy here with conditional assertions ) 3 4 in belief revision, which state what we would believe were the antecedent to be @
considered . PAL has a modal bisimulation-based model theory, with many interesting issues of expressive power and computational complexity.
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General dynamic epistemic logic More general product update for communicative and observational scenarios can also be dealt with in this dynamic logic format. The language of dynamic-epistemic logic (DEL) has the following syntax:
where ( Theorem DEL is effectively axiomatizable and decidable.
The key reduction axiom is the one extending that for public announcement: 
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Dynamic logics for belief revision and preference change The above format also provides complete logics for events of belief revision, and even more general preference change. These involve conditional beliefs, and compositional axioms for changes in them after 'hard facts' such as public announcements !P, or 'soft facts':
weaker triggers for belief revision
Model change and other dynamic frameworks The general idea behind update mechanisms for knowledge or belief is definable model change. One selects or even creates new individual objects (the worlds) out of old ones, and then redefines the relevant relations between them. There are other systems than dynamic logic in the computational literature with a similar flavour. E.g., process algebra is a family of calculi for constructing new processes out of given ones. Indeed, our product update MxA respects bisimulation in the standard process-algebraic sense. In our view, DEL is a nice calculus of model change intermediate between dynamic logic and process algebra, which combines an 'external language' for defining processes with an 'internal language' describing properties of states within these processes.
Merging major computational process paradigms may be a good idea in general . Nobody knows in the first round. Next, the muddy children argue as follows. "If I were clean, the one dirty child I see would have seen only clean kids, and so she would have known that she was dirty. But she did not. So I must be dirty, too!"
Program structures in conversation
This both know their status in the second round. The third child knows it is clean one round later. The puzzle easily extends to more clean and dirty children. Clearly, all three preceding program constructions occur here: sequential assertion, guarded action (children must respond differently depending on what they know), and iteration: the process repeats until common knowledge is achieved. These axioms work by recursion on the first argument of our modal statements
Adding full dynamic logic
[q ]e , rather than the second. It is known that PDL as a system of arbitrary actions is completely axiomatized by these principles -and indeed, it is decidable.
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Further constructions But conversation also involves further program operations.
It is crucial to the Muddy Children puzzle that the children answer simultaneously.
This is parallel composition of individual actions, as in distributed computing and process algebra. PAL treats simultaneous speech as announcing a conjunction, and
) is a simple analogue of a parallel composition! e || ! g .
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Temporal logic All this eventually embeds dynamic epistemic logics into broader epistemic temporal logics over branching trees of events (Fagin et al. 1995 , Parikh & Ramanujam 2003 . The latter perspective links up with another process tradition in computer science, viz. temporal logics in the style of Pnueli, Clarke, and others.
Cf. van Benthem & Pacuit 2006 for connections with our current setting.
Complexity of logical tasks
Computation involves a balance between representation and processing of data, and so do logical systems. While dynamic epistemic logics provide a rich account of effects of events that carry information, their expressive power has a price in terms of computational complexity. Indeed, any logical system can be used for a variety of core tasks which all involve computational complexity.
16 Together, the axioms for y * say that a universal modality [
is a greatest fixed-point operator.
17 Combining PDL with epistemic logic into a richer version of DEL will involve recursions on both actions and postconditions. The precise nature of this joint approach remains to be understood. 
Model checking
Reversing the direction: computation as conversation
We have amply shown by now how conversation can be viewed as computation, leading to interesting issues that can be studied by combining techniques from philosophical and computational logic. But this link also suggests an inversion in perspective. In particular, lower bound results concerning complexity often establish that some other problem of known complexity can be reduced to the current one.
And though these reductions may be quite technical, usually, they convey a lot more useful information, often of a semantic nature -and hence they establish stronger analogous than mere 'equi-difficulty'. To see this more concretely, take our analysis of conversation as a form of computation. The simple point that we wish to make now is that complexity analysis, as available in known results, also allows us to view
Computation as Conversation!
Realizing computation as conversation High-complexity results are often taken to be bad news, as they say that some logical task is hard to perform. But the good news here is that, by the very same token, an interesting transfer happens: the logic manages to encode significant problems with mathematical content. For instance, consider the famous result that SAT in propositional logic is NP-complete.
Reversing the perspective, this result also means that solving just one basic logical task has universal computational power for a large class of problems encountered in practice. Moreover, the proof of NP-completeness for propositional SAT even gives a simple translation from arbitrary computational tasks to logical ones. 22 The same reversal applies to other complexity classes. E.g., Pspace-complete is the solution complexity for many natural games (Papadimitriou 1994 , van Emde Boas 2002 , and hence being able to solve SAT problems in our base logic, i.e., the ability to create consistent epistemic scenarios suffices for solving lots of games. In what follows, I take one more step, which does not require us to 'take sides' here.
Merging computation and conversation
The real benefit of bringing together computation and conversation is not reduction of one to the other. It is creating a broader theory with interesting new questions.
In particular, a theory of computation that absorbs ideas from conversation must incorporate the dynamics of information flow and social interaction. We will mainly discuss one way of doing this here. It starts from known algorithms, and then adds further structure. We proceed by a series of examples, as our aim is merely to show how many new questions can be asked at once in this setting, without established answers. At the end, we note a few more general trends.
Epistemizing algorithms Consider the basic computational issue of Graph
Reachability (GR). Given a graph G with distinguished points x, y, is there a chain of directed arrows in G leading from x to y? This task can be solved in Ptime in the size of the graph: there are fast quadratic-time algorithms finding a path (Papadimitriou 1994) . The same analysis holds for the task of reachability of some point in G which satisfies some general goal condition
. GR models search problems in general, and the solution algorithm actually performs two closely related tasks: determining whether a route exists at all, and giving us an actual plan to get from x to y. We consider various ways of introducing knowledge and information.
Knowing you have made it Suppose you are an agent trying to reach a goal region , but with only limited observation of the graph in which you are moving. In particular, you need not know, at any point x, at which precise location you are. Thus, the graph G is now a model (G, R, ~) with accessibility arrows, but also is that one finds out if it holds, and then choose an action accordingly. But for this to work, the agent has to be able to perform that test! Say, we ask a computer to check the current value of some variable, or a burglar to check whether the safe has a Yale lock or some inferior brand. But in the above graph, the plan "IF you went Up, THEN move Across ELSE move Up", though correct as an instruction for reaching the goal, is no use, as the agent has no way of deciding which alternative holds. There are two ways of dealing with this. One is to include knowledge into programs (Fagin et al. 1995 multi-agent models, though, where one can query other agents, or perhaps Nature, about certain things. We will not pursue this topic here, but the logic DEL in this paper is a show case of 'dynamification'. Thus, it should be well-suited for analyzing dynamified algorithms -and so are epistemic variants of PDL or the -calculus.
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Multi agent scenarios and interactive games Several epistemic scenarios in the preceding suggest adding more than one agent, moving from traditional lonely algorithmic tasks to more social ones. E.g., reaching a goal and knowing that you At every stage of our trip, let the demon first take out one connection. Now we have a two-player sabotage game, and the question is who can win it where. Some simple reasoning will show that, from Saarbruecken, a German colleague still has a winning strategy. But the Dutch situation is less rosy: Demon has the winning strategy.
This example suggests a general transformation for any algorithmic task. It becomes a sabotaged one when cast as a game with obstructing players. This raises several new questions, e.g., about logical languages describing these games, and players' plans (strategies) in them. In particular: how does the computational complexity of the original task change when we need to solve the new game? For sabotaged Graph Reachability, it has been shown in Rohde 2005 that this complexity moves up from low P-time to Pspace-completeness. That is, the problem now takes a polynomial amount of memory space, which makes it of the complexity of Go or Chess.
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Catch Me If You Can But there is no general rule predicting when a newly created game becomes more complex than its algorithmic ancestor. Again consider graphs, the setting par excellence for algorithmic tasks, but now with another game variant of GR. 'Obstruction' could also mean that some other player tries to catch me en route, making it impossible for me to continue. It is easy to cast this as a game, too:
Starting from an initial position (G, x, y) with me located at x and you at y, I move first, then you, and so on. I win if I reach my goal region in some finite number of moves without meeting you. You win in all other cases.
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This game, too, is very natural, and it models a wide variety of realistic situations, such as warfare, or avoiding certain people at receptions. Rephrasing the issues in game theory? From a genuine game-theoretic viewpoint, many further questions may become relevant, however. E.g., Sevenster's major complexity results are in the IF tradition of asking whether some player has a winning strategy even when hampered by lack of knowledge. But the most crucial feature of finite games of imperfect information, both mathematically and in practice, is the existence of something more delicate: Nash equilibria in mixed strategies, letting players choose moves with certain probabilities. Maybe it is the resulting game values that we should be after for gamified algorithms. Thus, gamification as generalized computation should also make us pause and think about most natural counterparts to the properties of algorithms when they were still pure.
This is just one of many issues when we take game structure seriously. Imperfect information games also invite explicit events of observation and communication (Osborne & Rubinstein 1994 , van Benthem 1999 ). Moreover, they fit naturally with the parallel action mentioned earlier, as much of game theory is about simultaneous choice of moves by players. And then: why two players, and not more? E.g., even inside the heartland of logic games, it has been proposed that argumentation, often cast as a tennis match, really needs a 'Proponent', an 33 A direct argument is as follows. The game can be recast as a graph game over an extended graph with positions (G, x, y) counting players' moves as described while allowing you 'free moves' when I am caught or get stuck .Now we let you win if you can keep moving forever. It is known that graph games like this can be solved in Ptime. One can see this as a modal model checking problem for formulas <> n T with n the graph size.
'Opponent', and: a Judge. Thus, our view of algorithms in a social setting naturally merges computer science, logic, and game theory, with links running all across.
Toward a general theory: transformations and merges
Our discussion in the preceding section has been just a bunch of examples, trying to convey the pleasure of exploring an interactive epistemic viewpoint on computation.
But it also suggests several more systematic topics.
Epistemizing logics One broad concern is the design of appropriate logical languages for these new structures. This might seem a simple matter of combining components like dynamic and epistemic logic, but it can be much more interesting. 35 Next, relevant tasks for these languages can fall into the cracks of the standard notions of complexity. E.g., natural planning problems seem intermediate between model checking and satisfiability. They ask, in a given model M with state s, whether some epistemic plan exists which takes us from s to the set of goal states.
Thus, epistemizing logics seems a non-trivial exercise, once it is done with a heart. Perhaps a bit quixotically, what we are doing here can be seen as dynamification once more, but now at a meta-level. We have been using dynamic viewpoints to transform given problems in their original guise, and now, we are trying to make that process itself into an object of logical study. This is one way of seeing more unity in the diverse examples and logics that arise when 'computation and conversation' are latter includes an explicit account of 'communication channels', making the connection seems quite appropriate. 36 The same points apply to interaction and game semantics for computation. E.g., standard models for linear logic achieve nondeterminacy by moving to infinite games. But non-determinacy reigns in simple finite games with imperfect information, suggesting epistemic versions of linear game semantics. Also, strategies in linear logic crucially involve switching across games, and using information about moves in one to make best moves in the other (Abramsky 2006) : which is again well within our circle of ideas. 37 Of course, as we noted earlier, there is also the issue of how all this relates to existing game theory.
Epistemizing and gamifying algorithms
Perhaps, the current contacts between logic, computer science, and game theory, may be viewed as preliminaries to a new theory with aspects of all three.
Conclusions
This paper fits in a broad current trend. Bringing together computation and broader information-based activities of conversation and communication is in the air, and it has been there for at least two decades. It may be seen with the epistemic analyses of communication protocols in Fagin et al. 1995 , with calculi of distributed computing like Milner's CSP, and of course, with modern theories of agents and intelligent information systems. We have tried to show here that this trend is more than a metaphor by pointing at concrete logics which deal with it, and at a sequence of interesting new issues which arise when we merge the two agendas systematically.
To some, the resulting theory may look strange at first, as it combines hard-core computational logic with epistemic logics from the 'softer' philosophical traditionsomething which may look even more outrageous when we add, not just knowledge, but also agents more ephemeral beliefs, and who knows, even their intentions and most intimate desires. Still, we think computation plus information update and belief revision is a perfectly viable marriage. It is rich in theory, and also, it fits very well with modern computation in societies of interacting agents. Indeed, recent research programs like 'social software' (Parikh 2002) even take this into activist mode, and propose, not just analyzing existing social procedures in this style, but even designing new better ones. In this, social software is like 'mechanism design' in game theory, but pursued by sophisticated computational techniques.
As a counter-point to such 'soft' social settings, it needs to be said that the Dynamic Turn advocated in this paper is also observable in hard-core areas like physics. Another way of stating the main point of this paper is that computation is a pervasive and fundamental category across the sciences and humanities, provided we cast it in its proper generality, linking up with epistemic logics broadly construed. In one direction, our dynamic epistemic systems show how this introduces significant computational models into the study of what used to be thought of as preserves for linguists and philosophers. In the opposite direction, we can 'epistemize' and 'dynamify' existing logics and algorithms, to get interesting broader theories.
Returning to our Introduction, it should be clear that this is much more than 'implementation' in an auxiliary sense, but rather a way of letting fundamental ideas from computer science play the central academic role which they so clearly deserve.
Despite all these grand perspectives, this paper was written by a logician, as biasedHeaven knows -as the next person. This may be a good place for a disclaimer.
Despite the amount of space devoted to dynamic epistemic logic in this paper, we have used it mainly as a 'search-light system' for interesting phenomena, not as the final word on the structure and flow of information. Indeed, even from the viewpoint of the NEMO Restaurant, we have still missed crucial aspects of the children's 
